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G o v e r n m e n t ss e e mt oh a v es o m ei n ﬂuence on the decisions taken by the Governing Council of the
ECB. It has been argued that the publication of forecasts and minutes of the meetings of the Governing
Council would have a negative eﬀect due to the inﬂuence of governments on their representatives’
votes. In my model, the information provided reduces their inﬂuence and beneﬁts the Executive
Board. Both governments beneﬁt from the publication of minutes, while they sometimes disagree
with respect to the publication of forecasts. The model suggests that the current EMU members may
want to withhold the publication of forecasts when taking enlargement with a more heterogeneous
group of countries into account.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The rules of operation of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) stipulate that ”the Community
institutions and bodies and the governments of the Member States may not seek to inﬂuence the members
of the decision-making bodies of the ECB or of the NCBs in the performance of their tasks”. Yet, Issing
(1999) accepts that even in the absence of published votes, there will be attempts to inﬂuence policy-
makers. Buiter (1999) goes even further and says that national political authorities and other interested
parties will undoubtedly try to put pressure on ”their” nationals serving on the ECB Board as well as
”their” national central bank governors. The surprise rate cut by the ECB on May 10, 2001 might be an
example of such inﬂuence. According to AFX news (May 10) ”Some euro zone ﬁnance ministers, led by
euro group president Didier Reynders, hinted that they were looking to the ECB for an easing move”.
Reynders said that the discussions between the ECB and the eurogroup ”have had an inﬂuence on the
bank’s decision to lower rates”.
Buiter (1999) strongly advocates the publication of the minutes from the meetings of the Governing
Council and its relevant committees and sub-committees, the individual voting records of Governing
Council members and the inﬂation forecasts. Issing (1999) instead argues against publication in order to
defend a ”culture of collective responsibility” and not to ”allow national politicians or interest groups to
verify whether any pressure applied individually had the intended result”. He argues that ”publishing
forecasts could be misleading if it leads the public to attach more signiﬁcance to them than they have in
the decision making process”. Favero, Freixas, Persson, Wyplosz (2000) monitor the ECB and recommend
that individual voting records and minutes focusing on individual diﬀerences are not published in order to
facilitate the building of a collective reputation, but they consider that summary minutes not attributing
individual views would be possible and helpful. They recommend that the Council should publish its
internal forecasts on euro-wide inﬂation and output with appropriate qualiﬁcations concerning forecast
uncertainty.
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1The purpose of my paper is to build a model of decision making in the Governing Council of the ECB,
where the pressure of the national governments on their representatives aﬀects the decision taken by the
Council. Adding uncertainty about either the exact preferences of the Executive Board or its perception
of the state of the EMU economy allows me to evaluate one speciﬁc aspect of the publication of minutes
and forecasts.
Many papers study how the publication of forecasts and votes might inﬂuence the private sector,
but the fact that publication would aﬀect the pressure of national politicians on their representatives in
the Governing Council has not yet been analyzed.1 Dixit (2001) and Dixit and Jensen (2001) analyze
the inﬂuence from the diﬀerent governments on the ECB, but do not consider the issues of uncertainty
and publication. They consider a monetary union where the member governments (multiple principals)
act non-cooperatively to oﬀer general state-dependent contracts to the common central bank (common
agent). My paper instead considers a model with multiple principals and multiple agents, where each
government inﬂuences his own NCB. Jensen (2000a) uses the principal-agent approach to monetary policy
making in a two-country model, but each country has a separate monetary policy chosen by its own central
bank which obtains an incentive contract from its government. He shows that optimal outcomes can be
achieved using state-independent quadratic contracts.
Helpman and Persson (2001) develop a multiprincipal - multiagent model to analyze how the contri-
bution of lobbies to lawmakers may inﬂuence the contents of legislation. They assume that each lobby
group only makes contributions to a single lawmaker. This assumption is more appropriate in the present
paper as it is easier for a government to inﬂuence its own NCB than that of another country. In Helpman
and Persson, one lawmaker is randomly selected by nature to be the agenda setter, while in my paper,
an Executive Board Member is always the agenda setter and not subject to lobbying by any government.
The economy is represented by a very simple model of monetary policy, with an expectations-
augmented short-run Phillips curve, where the ECB can directly choose the inﬂation rate for the whole
EMU area. For simplicity, I will assume that the Governing Council is composed by two national central
bankers (NCBs) and one Executive Board Member (EBM). I model the decision-making process in the
Governing Council by way of an agenda-setter model where the EBM proposes an inﬂation rate for the
whole EMU area. This is a way of stressing that t h eE B Ms e e m st oh a v em o r es a yi nt h eG o v e r n i n g
Council’s decisions than the NCBs, maybe as a result of some monopoly on information. I consider
this assumption to reﬂect reality much better than the median-voter model. The proposed rate is only
implemented if accepted by at least one NCB, otherwise a default policy representing the status quo of
unchanged interest rates is implemented.
I model the national central bankers in the Governing Council as agents of their respective govern-
ments, tied by incentive contracts which can become state dependent only if the forecasts and minutes of
the Governing Council’s meetings are published. Otherwise, the contracts will be based on the govern-
ments’ expectations about the EBM’s preferences and their perceptions about the state of nature (more
speciﬁcally, the size of a supply shock) in the whole EMU area. These incentive contracts should, of
course, not be taken literally; they are a way of modelling the fact that the NCB’s future career (both
reappointment and future employment opportunities) often depends on pleasing the government.
I present both analytical and numerical results and analyze under which circumstances each of these
agents will favor publication. Given the chosen parameters, the EBM is always favorable to the publication
of both forecasts and minutes, as this allows him to propose his most preferred inﬂation rate unconstrained
in all states of the world. Non publication introduces noise into the incentive contracts faced by the NCBs.
1Other papers combine uncertainty concerning central bank preferences and asymmetric information about the state
of the economy. Cukierman and Metzler (1986) show that deliberately not minimizing errors in the monetary control
technology could be welfare improving, since it allows the monetary authorities to make better use of surprise inﬂation in
stabilization policy. This model has been extended by both Faust and Svensson (1998, 1999) in an inﬁnite horizon setting,
and Jensen (2000b) and Geraats (2001) in a two-period set-up. Faust and Svensson (1998, 1999) ﬁnd that transparency
is almost always preferred by society, but often not by the central bank which prefers discretion to pursue idiosyncratic
output goals. Jensen (2000b) reaches diﬀerent results than Faust and Svensson (1998); in his model, transparency is good
for credibility (reducing inﬂation expectations) but constrains ﬂexibility in the pursuit of output stabilization. Geraats
(2001) identiﬁes transparency with the release of central bank forecasts representing a complete summary of the central
bank’s (private) information on economic shocks. Transparency leads to lower inﬂation and gives the central bank greater
ﬂexibility to respond to shocks in the economy. Other papers, such as Cukierman (2000) and Tarkka and Mayes (1999),
analyze forecast publication in the context of models which do not assume uncertainty about central bank objectives. An
increased transparency could also be attained by publishing the individual voting records of central bankers, as analyzed
by Gersbach and Hahn (2001a,b) and Sibert (1999).
2When minutes or forecasts are not published, the incentive constraints of both NCBs bind and the EBM
must adapt his proposal in some states, which naturally increases his expected loss. The states where the
EBM is constrained are typically those where the supply shocks of both countries have diﬀerent signs;
thus, the pivotal government beneﬁts and the other government loses out.
In four simulated cases of ten the prejudice of not being pivotal in some states more than compensates
for the beneﬁt of being pivotal in others, so that both governments agree with the EBM in their preference
for publication. In four cases, one government prefers only minutes to be published, while the other
government and the EBM still want both minutes and forecasts to be published. In the remaining two
cases, both governments prefer that only minutes are published following a boom and both minutes and
forecasts published after a recession.
If the group of countries in the EMU is relatively homogeneous, the governments’ inﬂuence when
forecasts are not published does not considerably aﬀect the policies implemented. But the eﬀect of their
inﬂu e n c em a yi n c r e a s ei ft h eg r o u po fc o u n t r i e sb e c a m em o r eh e t e r o g e n e o u s ,a sw o u l db et h ec a s ew i t h
an enlargement of the EMU area. As a last exercise, I use the model to see whether the forthcoming
enlargement changes the attitude to publication of the countries currently in the EMU. I assume that the
group of countries to be incorporated in the EMU (”new” country) has higher targets for both inﬂation
and employment and faces a supply shock with higher variance.
The government of the ”old” country (the group of countries already in the EMU) has the largest
inﬂuence on the EBM’s proposal for both defaults rates, but with opposite eﬀect on the proposed rate.
The government of the ”new” country only appreciates the inﬂuence when the European economy is
coming out of a boom, as the proposed rate is then higher than π∗
EB. The government of the ”old”
country always beneﬁts from inﬂuencing the EBM’s decision and thus, it prefers forecasts not to be
published. Suppose that the governments of the countries currently in the EMU would decide on the
issue of publication, taking into account that the union could be enlarged in the future. Then, they are
likely to favor the publication of minutes but oppose the publication of forecasts in order to increase their
inﬂuence and reduce their expected losses after enlargement. Heterogeneity exacerbates the conﬂict of
interests and increases the value of the inﬂuence on the implemented policy.
Section 2 presents the model under no uncertainty, which also represents the situation when both
forecasts and minutes are published. Uncertainty is added in section 3, while section 4 shows the results
of the numerical analysis. Section 5 presents the conclusions of the paper.
2 The Model with no Uncertainty
The model of the economy is a further simpliﬁcation of what Persson and Tabellini (1999) call a simple
positive model of monetary policy. The Government Council of the ECB is assumed to consist of the
national central bankers (NCBs) of two countries making up the EMU, and one single Executive Board
Member (EBM). As the Governing Council consists of the Governors of the national central banks of
the 12 EMU countries plus six members of the Executive Board, this simpliﬁcation captures well the
proportion of NCBs and EBMs.
The demand side of the economy is represented by
π = m,
where π is the common inﬂation rate and m the money growth rate in the whole EMU area.
The supply side of the model assumes that the nominal wage setting in each country aims at imple-
menting an exogenous real wage growth rate, ωi. Letting πe denote rationally expected inﬂation, nominal
wage growth wi in country i then becomes
wi = ωi + πe.
Employment in country i satisﬁes
yi = γi − (wi − π)+εi,
3where γi is a constant and εi a supply shock. Combining the last two equations, we obtain an expectations-
augmented, short-run Phillips curve
yi = θi +( π − πe)+εi,
where θi ≡ γi − ωi can be interpreted as the natural rate of employment in country i.
The timing of events is as follows: (a) the private sector forms expectations πe, given θi, in both
countries and given the information available to governments, (b) the values of εi in both countries are
observed, (c) the Governing Council decides on a money growth rate m, which determines the inﬂation
rate π in the whole EMU area. In this section, the governments have complete information; in the next
section, I will introduce uncertainty about the EBM’s perception of the shock in the whole EMU area
and its exact preferences.
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The government of country i wants to stabilize both inﬂation and employment around some targeted
values, b πGi and b yGi. λGi is the relative weight the government puts on the ﬂuctuations in these two
variables. Ch
i is the contribution the government must pay to its NCB when choosing action h ∈ {A,R}.
Action h can be the approval (A) or the rejection (R) of the agenda setter’s proposal. In the following,
I refer to the ﬁrst term of the government’s loss function as LGi. The NCB of country i is assumed to
be non-benevolent, he only cares about the contributions he receives from his government. This extreme
assumption gives governments the maximum possible inﬂuence over their representatives’ votes. The
NCB thus has the following utility function
UNi = Ch
i . (1)
The contributions need not be taken literally, they could instead represent the fact that the NCB’s future
career prospects depend on the government being satisﬁed with his decisions. For simplicity, I will conﬁne









i is a constant the government sets optimally in order convince the NCB to choose the alternative
h it prefers. 2 These constants provide the NCB with a non-negative expected contribution if he acts
a c c o r d i n gt ot h eg o v e r n m e n t ’ sw i s h e s ,s ot h e r ei sn oneed to add a participation constraint for the NCB.
Besides, the constants Kh
i ensure that the government does not pay a larger contribution than needed
to induce the NCB to accept the proposal. These schedules completely align the NCB’s preferences with
the government’s preferences.
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2 + λEB (yU − b yEB)
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,
where yU is the average employment in the EMU area. I assume that the EBM’s most preferred rate of
employment, b yEB, always coincides with the natural rate of employment in the EMU area.
The decision process in the Governing Council is assumed to take the form of an agenda-setter model.
The EBM is the agenda setter proposing a policy m to both NCBs. If at least one of them accepts his
proposal, then policy m is implemented, otherwise a default policy is implemented. The default policy
is given and represents the status quo of unchanged interest rates. It is given because it depends on the
decision taken in the previous period. In a more complete model, the Governing Council would decide
whether to move the interest rate up, down or leave it constant. As π = m in this very simpliﬁed model,
I will describe the decision process as if the EBM made direct proposals over inﬂation rates, instead of
money growth or interest rates. Leaving the interest rate untouched in my simple model, where the only
2I assume that the NCB chooses the alternative preferred by the government whenever he is indiﬀerent.
4shock is a supply shock, would give a default inﬂation rate higher than b πEB following a recession and
lower following a boom.3
If the EBM were allowed to choose policy without constraint, he would choose an inﬂation rate









If the EBM were to propose this rate straightaway for some realizations of the shocks, both NCBs would
reject the proposal. The EBM can then adapt his proposal to a rate πP intermediate between π∗
EB and
πd, such that at least one NCB is indiﬀerent between his loss with πP and his loss with πd, while the
EBM has a lower loss with πP than with πd.
The private sector forms its expectations of the inﬂation rate by computing the probability of being
in each state of the world and using these probabilities as weights for the inﬂation expected to prevail in
each state, depending on whether the EBM is constrained. The fact that the EBM proposes a rate πP
diﬀe r e n tt h a nh i sm o s tp r e f e r r e dr a t ei ns o m es t a t e so ft h ew o r l da ﬀects π∗
EB in all other states through
the endogenous variable πe.
If the government of country i was instead allowed to choose an inﬂation rate unconstrained, for a









Given the realization of the shocks, the most preferred rates of the two governments and the EBM are






preferred rates of the two governments; no matter where the default rate is, one NCB is always ready to
accept the proposal, π∗
EB. The location of the default rate determines which NCB accepts the proposal.
For example, if πd < π∗
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Figure 2:
proposal depends on the location of the default rate:
3An alternative way of modeling the decision process would be to assume that the governments can ﬁrst attempt to
inﬂuence the EBM’s proposal and then buy the votes of the diﬀerent national central bankers, a situation described as
”inﬂuencing a legislature with an agenda setter - multiple interest groups” in Grossman and Helpman (2001). In that
approach, the agenda setter would choose a proposal maximizing a weighted sum of his own expected utility in the voting
stage (−LEB) and the contributions he obtains from the two governments, while taking into account whether this proposal
has a reasonable chance of succeeding. In some states of the world, we could observe the EBM making proposals that are
accepted with some probability. This assumption would make it more diﬃcult to obtain unique results and to analyze the





(π − b πEB)2 + λEB (π − πe + εU)2
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The ﬁrst-order condition is π − b πEB + λEB (π − πe + εU)=0⇒ π = 1
1+λEB b πEB +
λEB
1+λEB (πe − εU).
5(b1) if πd ≤ π∗
EB, then the default alternative is worse for both governments than π∗
EB, so that the
EBM proposes π∗
EB and both NCBs accept the proposal.
(b2) if π∗
EB < πd < π∗
G1, then both governments will prefer πd to π∗
EB and the EBM can propose no
rate that is better for both the NCB of country 1 and the EBM than πd,s oπd will be implemented.
(b3) if π∗
EB < π∗








1 , then the EBM will have to propose a rate πP intermediate between π∗
EB and πd










(b4) if πd is very far from π∗





+K1, then again the
EBM proposes π∗
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Figure 3:
Case (c), illustrated in Figure 3, is the same as case (b), but with opposite signs and country
subindexes. These possible outcomes are characteristic of the agenda-setter model associated with Romer
and Rosenthal (1978, 1979), a well known way of modelling collective decision making in a committee.
It may be worth noticing that there is no competition among national central bankers. There is no
intrinsic beneﬁt from being the pivotal voter, that is, the one accepting the EBM’s proposal. The loss of
the NCB (and of the respective government) depends on the rate proposed, no matter who accepts the
proposal and the NCB cannot do any better by accepting a worse proposal in order to become pivotal.
In cases (b3) and (c3), governments could use strategic delegation, not to compete among themselves,
but to compete against the EBM. Strategic delegation to induce more extreme NCB preferences would
help the governments obtain a proposal closer to their preferred rates. Both governments could try to
induce NCB preferences that make the EBM indiﬀerent between the limit of the acceptance set and the
default rate. This would be a way of shifting power from the EBM to the governments. By conﬁning myself
to globally truthful contribution schedules, I am ruling out the possibility of such strategic delegation.
The exact proposal, given the expected inﬂation πe, can be obtained by solving the EBM’s problem
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where j is the NCB that is easiest to convince and εU = ε1+ε2
2 . Substituting (2) and (1) into (3) and
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− Kj ≤ 0,
where Kj ≡ KA
j − KR
j is a given constant. The constraint implies that indirectly, the EBM must make
at least one of the governments better oﬀ with his proposal than with the default rate. The incentive
contract means that the NCB is given an acceptance set of rates around π∗
Gi by his government, where
the length of the interval depends on the default rate, the expected inﬂation, the preferences of the
government and the supply shock.
Before making a proposal, the EBM checks if any of the governments is better oﬀ with π∗
EB than with
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where yj ≡ b yj − θj is the diﬀerence between the most preferred rate of employment and the natural
rate of employment in country j. I assume that country j’s government is cheapest to convince and the
constraint is binding. The NCB of country j is called pivotal when his incentive constraint is satisﬁed.
This problem gives the ﬁrst-order condition:
π[1 + λEB + δ (1 + λGj)] = b πEB + λEB (πe − εU)+δ b πGj + δλ Gj
¡
πe − εj + yj
¢
.
The proposed rate πP, for a given πe, is
πP =
1
1+λEB + δ + δλ Gj
·
b πEB + δ b πGj + δλ Gj yj+
(λEB + δλ Gj) πe − (λEB εU + δλ Gj εj)
¸
. (5)









the value of the multiplier δ can be obtained. We can ﬁnd the conditions under which πP and π∗
EB
coincide:
• If the constraint does not bind, so that δ =0 .
• For a given δ and πe, assuming that the constraint hypotetically binds, they would coincide if the
targeted rates of the EBM and government j coincide, so that they have the same inﬂation objective
b πEB = b πGj and no credibility problem yj =0and if, at the same time, government j has the same
weight on inﬂation and employment stabilization as the EBM, λGj = λEB, and the same demand
for stabilization as the EBM, εj = εU.
However, no strict comparison is possible at this point, as πe is an endogenous variable and the
multiplier δ is a non-linear function of all parameters. In a normal Barro-Gordon model, one would
follow two further steps to complete the solution : (1) compute the expected inﬂation πe by taking
expectations of πP and (2) plug πe back into the ﬁrst order condition to solve for πP. An analytical
solution of the model would then be obtained. As the preset model is not recursive, however, I must
instead solve both steps jointly. Because of this simultaneity and the associated non-linearity, multiple
equilibria are very diﬃcult to rule out, a priori.5 But I have never encountered multiple equilibria in my
numerical examples.
3 The Model with Uncertainty
In this section, the governments face two types of uncertainty. First, they may not be certain of the
EBM’s exact perception of the average shock in the EMU area. Second, they may not be certain of the
exact preferences of the EBM, i.e., they may not be certain of the exact value of parameter b πEB, the
inﬂation rate targeted by the EBM. Introducing both types of uncertainty in the analysis increases the
noise faced by the governments when writing the incentive contract and modiﬁes the interval of rates the
NCB is induced to accept. The uncertainty about the EBM’s preferences also introduces noise into the
private sector’s inﬂation expectations.
I will assume that the ﬁrst type of uncertainty can be eliminated by the publication of the forecasts
of the ECB and the second type by the publication of the minutes of the Governing Council meetings.
This is obviously a simpliﬁcation that tries to capture the fact that publication should help reduce both
5In this respect, the model reminds me of the escape-clause model of Obstfeld (1997), who stresses multiple equilibria.
7types of uncertainty. In the literature, the disclosure of central bank forecasts has been called ”economic
transparency”, while the openness about policy objectives, like explicit inﬂation targets, has been called
”political transparency”.6
Given the timing of the model, forecasts published in connection with the realization of the shock
can be used by the governments in their incentive contracts with their NCBs. But the information is not
available and thus, cannot be used by the private sector when forming its inﬂation expectations. When
forecasts are not published, the governments form their expectations about the EBM’s perception of the
EMU average shock. The private sector expects the error of the governments to equal the average error,
namely zero, when forming its inﬂation expectations. Government i’s estimate of the EBM’s perception





















to ﬁgure out which rate the EBM will propose in each state of the world. I will assume that
the EBM observes the correct εU =
εi+εj
2 , so that αi is the error committed by government i when
estimating the EBM’s perception of the EMU average shock. The errors committed by both governments
are uncorrelated and have zero expected value.
The publication of the minutes of the Governing Council meetings over time helps everyone learn
about the preferences of the EBM. When minutes are not published, I assume that the private sector in
each country shares the government’s view of the EBM’s targeted inﬂation and is unaware that it may
commit an error, so that this error is incorporated in the private sector’s inﬂation expectations.7 The
government is thus uncertain about the exact inﬂation rate targeted by the EBM. I will assume that
government i believes the inﬂation rate targeted by the EBM to be
EGi (b πEB)=b πEB + βi,
where βi is the error government i commits when estimating the EBM’s targeted rate. I assume once
more that the errors committed by both governments are uncorrelated and have zero expected value.
I also analyze what happens if the errors made by the two governments are perfectly positively
correlated, that is, if both governments either overestimate or underestimate εEB
U or b πEB.
When uncertainty is introduced, government i’s contribution schedule becomes a function of the errors
it commits. Through the contribution schedule, each government provides its NCB with an acceptance
set based only on the veriﬁable information available to the government before the meeting.
When neither minutes nor forecasts are published, government i’s estimate of π∗
EB, for a given ex-
























































6These names agree with the classiﬁcation of transparency proposed by Geraats (2001).
7As a simpliﬁcation, I assume that the publication of minutes helps the private sector learn about the EBM’s preferences
which change over time, while they remain ignorant otherwise. This assumption is valid in a transitional phase, but not in
the long run as the private sector would learn how to estimate b πEB over time. For example, in Faust and Svensson (1998),
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j is the private sector’s expected inﬂation across all states of the world. The solution to this
problem is the proposed rate πP
πP =
1
1+λEB + γ + γλ Gj
·
b πEB + γ b πGj + γλ Gj yj+
(λEB + γλ Gj)πe
j − (λEB εu + γλ Gj εj)
¸
. (6)
This proposed rate looks just like (5), except for the multiplier being diﬀerent. The new multiplier γ can
be obtained by substituting the inﬂation rate in (6) into the constraint.
The consequence of publication can be seen in a numerical example with speciﬁc parameter values and
a given realization of shocks and errors presented in Appendix 1. In the example, when either minutes
or forecasts are not published, the most preferred rates of all agents and the estimated most preferred
rate of the EBM are ordered as follows:
π∗
G1 <E G2 (π∗
EB) < πd <E G1 (π∗
EB) < π∗
G2.
Both governments believe that they prefer the default rate rather than EGi (π∗
EB) and determine an
acceptance set around π∗
Gi.
When neither forecasts nor minutes are published, the interval of rates the NCBs are induced to
accept is all rates such that LG1 ≤ 1536 for the NCB of country 1 (NCB1) and LG2 ≤ 1032 for NCB2.
In this particular case, the EBM prefers the default rate of 0.015 to all rates in the two intervals, so that
he either directly proposes πd or proposes π∗
EB but both NCBs reject this proposal. When only minutes
are published, the corresponding intervals are all rates such that LG1 ≤ 2125 and LG2 ≤ 1525. The
constraints are less binding and the EBM can now satisfy NCB1 by proposing the rate πP =0 .0063,a n
intermediate rate between π∗
G1 and π∗
EB. When only forecasts are published, the intervals are LG1 ≤ 1530
and LG2 ≤ 1030 and the EBM again prefers the default rate to all rates in the two intervals.
When both minutes and forecasts are published, both governments understand that the most preferred
rates of all agents are ordered as follows:
π∗
G1 < π∗
EB < πd < π∗
G2.
This corresponds to case (a) in the previous section. Government 1 prefers π∗
EB to πd so the EBM can
propose his most preferred rate and NCB1 will accept his proposal.
In the states of the world where the EBM is not unconstrained (the ones that are interesting for
analyzing the issue of publication), introducing uncertainty reduces the acceptance interval of both NCBs.
This makes it more unlikely that the EBM’s most preferred rate is accepted, more often constraining him
when he proposes an inﬂation rate.
Because the constraints faced by the EBM are most binding when minutes and forecasts are unpub-
lished, the governments’ inﬂuence on the proposed rate is strongest in this regime, while publication
reduces their inﬂuence. One might thus think that publication is bad for governments, since they lose
power, but that is not necessarily true. The example in this section dealt with just one possible realiza-
tion of the shocks and errors. To ﬁnd out whether publication is good or bad ex ante, it is necessary to
consider the full equilibrium decisions and economic outcomes in the diﬀerent states of the world. This
is done by numerical examples in the next section.
94 Numerical Analysis
As explained before, I can only fully describe the voting process and compare the expected losses of all
agents in a numerical analysis. I call the set of parameters in the example of the previous section the
benchmark case. This symmetric case is a good starting point for the analysis, but it is not realistic.
Governments with diﬀerent preferences or distribution of errors and whose countries have diﬀerent dis-
tributions of supply shocks may have diﬀerent preferences with respect to publication. So I look at the
eﬀect of diﬀerences in the parameters by changing them, ﬁrst one at a time and then simultaneously,
t r y i n gt oa n a l y z et h ee ﬀect of the enlargement of the EMU.
The parameters in the benchmark case are: λEB = λG1 = λG2 =1; b πEB = b πG1 = b πG2 =0 .01;
y1 = y2 =0 . The deviations I study are: high λG2 (λG2 =2 ) ;h i g hλG1 and λG2 (λG1 = λG2 =2 ) ;
high b πG2 (b πG2 =0 .02);h i g hb πG1 and b πG2 (b πG1 = b πG2 =0 .02);h i g hy2 (y2 =0 .02) and high y1 and y2
(y1 = y2 =0 .02).
With respect to the shocks and errors, I assume that they can either take on a high or a low value,
with equal absolute value but diﬀerent signs. These occur with equal probability, so that their expected
value is zero. The supply shock εi can take on the values −ei and +ei, the error government i commits
when estimating the EBM’s perception of the EMU average shock, αi, takes on values −ai and +ai
and the error committed by government i when estimating the EBM’s targeted inﬂation rate, βi, takes
on the values −bi and +bi. In the benchmark and other cases described above, I have assumed that
e1 = e2 =0 .06,a 1 = a2 =0 .02,b 1 = b2 =0 .01. I look at three further cases: low e2 (e2 =0 .03), low b2
(b2 =0 .0075) and low a2 (a2 =0 .01). Initially, I assume that the errors committed by both governments
are independent. But I also describe how the results are aﬀected by assuming errors to be perfectly
positively correlated. For the supply shocks, I look at ﬁve alternative correlation patterns.
When both forecasts and minutes are published, there are four states of the world: four combinations
of the two possible supply shocks in each country. Figure 6 in Appendix 2 shows the probabilities of these
states of the world under the alternative correlation assumptions. When either minutes or forecasts are
published, there are 16 states of the world and when neither minutes nor shocks are published, there are
64 states of the world. Figures 4 and 5 give numbers to all these states, so that I can refer to them in
the following tables.
The last parameter that needs to be given a numerical value is the default rate, πd, supposed to
represent the status quo outcome under unchanged policy. I will look at three values: πd =1 .5%
corresponding to a period following a recession (a low default interest rate), πd =1 % , and πd =0 .5%
corresponding to a period following a boom.
I present most results corresponding to the assumption of independent supply shocks, since assuming
correlation between the supply shocks does not change the preference ordering of the agents. Figure 7
in Appendix 2 presents the development of the decision process and the expected losses of all agents for
the diﬀerent correlation assumptions in the benchmark case. Figures 8 to 10 present the expected losses
of all agents under diﬀerent publication alternatives and default rates. I show how the voting process is
resolved, namely in which cases the EBM is allowed to propose his most preferred rate unrestricted and
which NCB is pivotal in the diﬀerent states of the world.
The table in Figure 11 summarizes the preferred publication alternatives of all agents corresponding
to the diﬀerent default rates. MF refers to the publication of both minutes and forecasts and M to the
publication of minutes only. For all parameter values in the ten cases analyzed, the incentive constraints
are never binding when both minutes and forecasts are published, so that the EBM can simply propose his
most preferred rate in all states of the world. This is not necessarily the case, I could choose parameters
such that both incentive constraints bind even when minutes and forecasts are published. It would still
be the case, however, that the constraints are more binding and governments have more inﬂuence under
non publication. The EBM’s expected losses are always lowest when the constraints are less binding, so
that he will always prefer minutes and forecasts to be published.
The EBM is mostly constrained in states of the world where the supply shocks have diﬀerent signs in
both countries, so that the governments have opposite interests and most often beneﬁti ft h e i ro w nN C B
is pivotal but lose otherwise.
When the economy is coming out of a recession or boom, the ten cases analyzed can be divided into
three groups.
10• Both NCBs agree with the publication preferences of the EBM: in the benchmark case, when one
or both governments put a high relative weight on the ﬂuctuation of output (high λGi) and when
one government commits a smaller error when estimating the EBM’s inﬂation target (low βi),
the prejudice of not being pivotal in some states more than compensates for the beneﬁto fb e i n g
pivotal in some other states, so that both governments agree with the EBM in their preference for
publication.
• One NCB agrees with the EBM while the other is opposed to the publication of forecasts: when
one government has a higher target for inﬂation or employment than the other and the EBM (high
b πG2 and y2), when one country has a smaller variance of the supply shock (low e2) a n dw h e no n e
government commits a smaller error when estimating the EBM’s perception of the EMU average
shock (low a2), the uncertainty beneﬁts one government (the one with a higher target for inﬂation
or employment, a smaller variance in the supply shock and a higher error when estimating the
EBM’s perception of the EMU average shock) but hurts the other.
• Both NCBs prefer that only minutes are published in the period following a boom (a low default
inﬂation rate corresponding to a high default interest rate) and that both minutes and forecasts are
published after a recession: when both governments have a higher target for inﬂation or employment
than the EBM, they have a stronger preference for inﬂation than the EBM. The stimulation of the
economy provided by higher inﬂation is more valuable following a recession than a boom. But the
NCBs are pivotal in states where they want lower inﬂation than the EBM following a recession
(higher after a boom), so the governments prefer not to inﬂuence the proposed rate.
The publication of minutes is always beneﬁcial as it corrects the error committed by the private
sector when estimating the EBM’s targeted inﬂation rate. In general, the publication of forecasts makes
no diﬀerence when the cycle is rapidly changing, that is, when the default rate is very far from the
rate targeted by the governments; when the default rate coincides with the most preferred rate of the
EBM and when the supply shocks are strongly positively correlated in the EMU area, as all agents then
have more aligned interests. When there was neither a recession nor a boom in the previous period, the
EBM is most often unconstrained even if only minutes are published, and the three agents agree on their
preference for either minutes or both minutes and forecasts to be published.8
One might think that both governments have an incentive to make their NCBs attractive as the pivotal
agent to get a proposed rate closer to their most preferred rate. Both governments would then compete
in accepting rates increasingly closer to the EBM’s most preferred rate. The result of this competition
would be that the EBM is never constrained, notwithstanding the level of uncertainty. But this cannot
occur, given my assumptions. When each government writes the incentive contract, it is unaware of
committing an error with respect to the EBM’s preferences and perception of the EMU shock, so it acts
as if there were no uncertainty. In this case, there is no beneﬁt from competing to become pivotal as
already explained in section 2.
I assume that the errors committed by both governments when estimating the EBM’s perception
o ft h eE M Ua v e r a g es h o c k(αi) are perfectly positively correlated in the benchmark case. This does
not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the expected losses of the agents when forecasts are not published. When the
errors committed by both governments in estimating the EBM’s targeted inﬂation rate (βi) are perfectly
positively correlated, it hurts the EBM, but there is no signiﬁcant eﬀect on the governments’ expected
losses because they win in some states and lose in others.
If the group of countries in the EMU is relatively homogeneous, the governments’ inﬂuence when
forecasts are not published does not have a considerable eﬀect on the implemented policies. But the
eﬀect of their inﬂuence may increase if the group of countries became more heterogeneous, as would be
the case with an enlargement of the EMU area. An interesting application of the model is to ask whether
the countries’ preferences with respect to publication would change in case the EMU area were enlarged.
To do that, I identify one country in the model (called ”old”) with the current EMU area and the other
8The reason for this is that the EBM is often constrained when supply shocks have diﬀerent signs in both countries, but
in this particular alternative, a zero average EMU supply shock means that π∗
EB = πd =0 .01, so that the governments are
indiﬀerent between the default rate and the EBM’s most preferred rate. Note, however, that a small change in the EMU
average shock and the EBM’s most preferred rate as in the case with low e2 m e a n st h a tt h eE B Mi sc o n s t r a i n e di ns o m e
states of the world.
11country (called ”new”) with the group of countries that would be included in an enlarged EMU. For
obvious reasons, I assume that the government of the ”new” country has a higher target for inﬂation and
a preferred employment rate exceeding the natural rate. Furthermore, the ”new” country’s supply shock
has a higher variance. All three parameter perturbations are included in the second group distinguished
above, that is, one NCB agrees with the EBM while the other is in favor of the publication of minutes
but opposed to the publication of forecasts. However, as shown before, the eﬀect of a higher variance
of the supply shock is opposite to the eﬀect of higher targets for inﬂation and employment. Thus, the
consequence of such an enlargement is not straightforward. Once more, I can only fully describe the
voting process and compare the expected losses of all agents in a numerical analysis.
The speciﬁc parameter values I assume are: λEB = λGO = λGN =1; b πEB = b πGO =0 .01 ; b πGN =0 .03
; yO =0; yN =0 .02 ; eO =0 .03 ; eN =0 .06 ; aO = aN =0 .02 and bO = bN =0 .01. The table in Figure
12 in Appendix 2 presents the expected losses of all agents under diﬀerent publication alternatives and
default rates and how the voting process is resolved. As was the case before, the EBM is always in favor
of publishing both minutes and forecasts as this allows it to propose its more preferred rate in all states
of the world and the governments of both countries favor the publication of minutes to correct the error
committed by the private sector when estimating the EBM’s targeted inﬂation rate.
The government of the ”old” country inﬂuences most the EBM’s proposal for both defaults rates, but
with opposite eﬀect on the proposed rate. The government of the ”new” country only appreciates the
inﬂuence when the European economy is coming out of a boom, as the proposed rate is then higher than
π∗
EB. The government of the ”old” country always beneﬁts from inﬂuencing the EBM’s decision, so it
prefers forecasts not to be published.
Suppose that the governments of the countries currently in the EMU were to decide on the issue of
publication taking into account that the union might be enlarged in the future. Then, they are likely to
favor the publication of minutes but oppose the publication of forecasts to increase their inﬂuence and
reduce their expected losses after the enlargement. Heterogeneity exacerbates the conﬂict of interests
and increases the value of the inﬂuence on the implemented policies.
5 Conclusions
Despite the stringent rules of operation of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), governments
seem to have some inﬂuence in the decisions taken by the Governing Council of the ECB. I have modelled
the governments’ inﬂuence by help of a multiprincipal-multiagent model, where each national central
banker tries to satisfy his own government in order to ensure a better career in the future. This way
of modelling the relationship gives the governments considerable inﬂuence; before any meeting of the
Governing Council, the governments induce their national central banker to accept rates within a certain
acceptance set and reject any other proposal.
As a counterweight to this high level of national inﬂuence, I assume that the voting process takes the
form of an agenda-setter model, where the Executive Board member proposes a policy (an inﬂation rate).
This voting process gives more power to the agenda setter who only needs to make one national central
banker (called pivotal) indiﬀerent between his proposal and the default rate.
I use this model to analyze the publication of forecasts and minutes of the Governing Council meetings.
It has been argued that publication would have a negative eﬀect due to the inﬂuence of governments on
their national central bankers’ votes. In my model, the published information is incorporated in the
incentive contracts governments oﬀer to their agents, which actually makes the contracts less binding.
This reduces the governments’ inﬂuence on the proposed rate instead of increasing it and thus beneﬁts
the EBM.
In four of the ten parameter constellations that I analyze, one government beneﬁts from the inﬂuence
and prefers forecasts not to be published, while the other agrees with the EBM. In four cases, both
governments agree with the EBM in their preference for the publication of forecasts. Only in two cases do
both governments prefer forecasts not to be published. The publication of the minutes further eliminates
the error committed by the private sector when estimating the EBM’s targeted inﬂation rate, which is
always beneﬁcial for all agents.
12S h o u l dt h em i n u t e so ft h em e e t i n g sa n df o r e c a s t sb e published? My numerical analysis does not give
ad e ﬁnitive answer to the normative question, but it gives some insights into how the decision might be
taken. Suppose that the Governing Council itself has to decide on the issue of publication. The decision
to be taken should depend on the procedure for making the decision. If the median voter is allowed to
decide or the EBM is allowed to make a proposal (as an agenda setter), the Council would decide in favor
of the publication of both forecasts and minutes for most parameter values. If the decision must instead
be taken with unanimity, the Council would have a harder time agreeing on the publication of forecasts.
The same would be true if the publication had to be decided by a direct agreement among governments
and the Executive Board members.
These predictions do not seem to match reality: the Executive Board appears to prefer secrecy and
no government seems to be in favor of the publication of minutes. This does not necessarily mean that
the previous analysis is incorrect, as I have only studied one speciﬁce ﬀect of publication. Publication is
likely to aﬀect ﬁnancial markets, might make it harder for the Governing Council to build a collective
reputation, etc. All these additional eﬀects may explain why minutes and forecasts are not published. The
contribution of this paper is to analyze - and maybe refute - one common argument against publication,
namely that it would have a negative impact on their national representatives through the inﬂuence of
governments.
As a last exercise, I use the model to see if the forthcoming enlargement changes the attitude to
publication of the countries currently in the EMU. I assume that the group of countries to be incorporated
in the EMU has higher targets for both inﬂation and employment and faces a supply shock with higher
variance. The higher level of heterogeneity exacerbates the conﬂict of interests. The model suggests that
the current EMU members may want to withhold the publication of forecasts when taking enlargement
with a more heterogeneous group of countries into account.
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14A Appendix 1
The parameters I will look at are: λEB = λG1 = λG2 =1 ; b πEB = b πG1 = b πG2 =0 .01; y1 = y2 =0
and πd =0 .015. The realization of the shocks and errors are: ε1 =0 .06; ε2 = −0.06; α1 = −0.02;
α2 =+ 0 .02; β1 =+ 0 .01 and β2 = −0.01.
In this particular case, when neither minutes nor forecasts are published, the expected inﬂation rates
(average of the inﬂation expectations in all states of the world given β1and β2)a r eπe
1 =0 .0198 and
πe
2 =0 .00015. The governments estimate the EBM’s most preferred rate as EG1 (π∗
EB)=0 .0299 and
EG2 (π∗
EB)=−0.0099. The expected losses9 of the two governments at EGi (π∗
EB) are LG1 (EG1 (π∗
EB),A,ε1)=
2657and LG2 (EG2 (π∗









= 1032.This means that even for the minimal Ki =0 , the
EBM cannot propose his most preferred rate unrestricted as 2657 > 1536 and 2654 > 1032, he must
instead adapt his proposal to such a rate that at least one NCB accepts it.
In this example, the interval of rates the NCBs are induced to accept are all rates such that LG1 (EG1 (π),A,ε1) ≤
1536 for NCB1 and all rates such that LG2 (EG2 (π),A,ε2) ≤ 1032 for NCB2. The most preferred rate for
government 1 in this particular case is π∗
G1 = −0.01, so that the EBM would have to propose a lower rate
than π∗
EB =0 .01 to convince NCB1 to accept his proposal. The multiplier turns out to be γ1 =0 .3278
and the corresponding proposed rate would be πP =0 ,00258.This rate is worse for the EBM than the
default rate, so the EBM instead proposes πP =0 .015.
When only minutes are published, the governments estimate the EBM’s most preferred rate as
EG1 (π∗
EB)=0 .02 and EG2 (π∗
EB)=0 . The private sector’s expected inﬂa t i o ni nb o t hc o u n t r i e se q u a l s
0.01 and the expected losses of the two governments at EGi (π∗
EB) are LG1 (EG1 (π∗
EB),A,ε1) = 2500and
LG2 (EG2 (π∗









= 1525. Even for Ki =0 , the EBM cannot propose his most preferred rate un-
restricted as 2500 > 2125. Therefore, he will have to adapt his proposal to a rate in the acceptance set
of at least one NCB. The EBM is still constrained when proposing an inﬂation rate, but the constraints
are less binding, so that the EBM can propose a rate closer to π∗
EB =0 .01 than before. The EBM can
now satisfy NCB1 by proposing the rate πP =0 .0063 and the corresponding multiplier is γ2 =0 .1429.
The publication of minutes reduces the noise in the incentive contracts written by the governments, i.e.,
makes the acceptance sets of both NCBs wider, which translates into a smaller multiplier.
When only forecasts are published, the endogenous value of the expected inﬂa t i o ni nc o u n t r y1w h e n
β1 is positive is πe
1 =0 .0195 and the expected inﬂation in country 2 when β2 is negative is πe
2 =0 .0006, so
both governments will estimate the EBM’s most expected rate as EG1 (π∗
EB)=0 .01995 and EG2 (π∗
EB)=
0.00007. The expected losses of the two governments at EGi (π∗
EB) are LG1 (EG1 (π∗
EB),A,ε1)=
1852and LG2 (EG2 (π∗









=1 0 3 0 . The EBM is once more constrained and must adapt his
proposal to please NCB1. The most preferred rate for government 1 in this particular case is π∗
G1 = −0.01,
so that the EBM would have to propose a lower rate than π∗
EB =0 .01 to convince NCB1 to accept his pro-
posal. Such a rate is worse for the EBM than the default rate, so the EBM instead proposes πP =0 .015.
When both minutes and forecasts are published, both governments estimate the EBM’s most preferred
rate as π∗
EB =0 .01 since πe =0 .01 and εU =0 . The private sector’s inﬂation expectation in both
countries EPi(π∗
EB) also equals 0.01, so that the expected losses of the two governments at π∗
EB are
LG1 (π∗
EB,A,ε1) = 1800 and LG2 (π∗









=1 5 2 5. As 1800 < 0.002125,t h eE B Mc a nc h o o s e
his most preferred rate unrestricted and the NCB1 will accept his proposal.
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17Correlation between 
supply shocks LoG1 LoG2 LoEB LoG1 LoG2 LoEB LoG1 LoG2 LoEB LoG1 LoG2 LoEB
Pivotal NCB
No correlation 1350 1350 450 1352 1352 452 1402 1402 478 1399 1399 475
Partial + correlation 1170 1170 630 1171 1171 631 1221 1221 657 1219 1219 655
Total + correlation 900 900 900 900 900 900 949 949 925 948 948 924
Partial - correlation 1530 1530 270 1533 1533 272 1583 1583 299 1579 1579 296
Total - correlation 1800 1800 0 1804 1804 4 1855 1855 31 1850 1850 26
Losses multiplied by 1000000 ***1  NCB1 in states 23,34,44 ; NCB2 in states 19,24,42
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LoG1 LoG2 LoEB LoG1 LoG2 LoEB LoG1 LoG2 LoEB LoG1 LoG2 LoEB
Bench- Pivotal NCB
mark Losses 1350 1350 450 1352 1352 452 1402 1402 478 1399 1399 475
High Pivotal NCB
λG2 Losses 1350 2475 450 1353 2476 452 1402 2553 478 1399 2549 475
High Pivotal NCB
λG1, λG2  Losses 2475 2475 450 2478 2478 452 2553 2553 478 2550 475 475
High Pivotal NCB
π G2 Losses 1350 1400 450 1352 1397 452 1403 1459 478 1399 1450 475
High Pivotal NCB
π G1, π G2  Losses 1400 1400 450 1396 1396 452 1459 1458 478 1449 1449 475
High Pivotal NCB
y2 Losses 1350 1550 450 1357 1539 452 1403 1615 478 1398 1604 475
High Pivotal NCB
y1. y2  Losses 1550 1550 450 1542 1542 453 1616 1615 478 1616 1612 498
Low Pivotal NCB
e2 Losses 1181 506 281 1189 500 282 1236 550 306 1262 551 320
Low Pivotal NCB
b2 Losses 1350 1350 450 1352 1352 452 1383 1399 472 1384 1392 470
Low Pivotal NCB
a2 Losses 1350 1350 450 1337 1365 451 1402 1402 478 1399 1399 475
Losses multiplied by 1000000 ***1  NCB1 in states 23,34,44 ; NCB2 in states 19,24,42
***2  NCB1 in st.23,34,42,44;NCB2 in st.19,24 ***3  NCB1 st.34,42,44,60 ; NCB2 st.19,23,24,52,56,64
***4  NCB1 st.19,23,42,58,62;NCB2 st.24,41,46,61
NCB1st7, 2 st10,16 NCB1st6, NCB2st11 ***3
NCB1st6, NCB2st11
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EBM not constrained NCB1st7, NCB2st10 NCB1st6, NCB2st11
EBM not constrained NCB1st7, NCB2st10 NCB1st6, NCB2st11
EBM not constrained NCB1st6, NCB2st11
EBM not constrained NCB1st7, NCB2st10 NCB1st6, NCB2st11
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EBM not constrained NCB1st6, NCB2st11
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Min and For not Pub.
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EBM not constrained NCB1 in st 10 NCB1 in st 11
Figure 8:
18Case
LoG1 LoG2 LoEB LoG1 LoG2 LoEB LoG1 LoG2 LoEB LoG1 LoG2 LoEB
Bench- Pivotal NCB
mark Losses 1350 1350 450 1350 1350 450 1398 1398 474 1398 1398 474
High Pivotal NCB
λG2 Losses 1350 2475 450 1350 2475 450 1398 2546 474 1398 2549 474
High Pivotal NCB
λG1, λG2  Losses 2475 2475 450 2475 2475 450 2547 2547 474 2550 2550 474
High Pivotal NCB
π G2 Losses 1350 1400 450 1350 1400 450 1397 1446 474 1397 1447 474
High Pivotal NCB
π G1, π G2  Losses 1400 1400 450 1400 1400 450 1446 1446 474 1446 1446 474
High Pivotal NCB
y2 Losses 1350 1550 450 1350 1550 450 1397 1599 474 1417 1582 475
High Pivotal NCB
y1. y2  Losses 1550 1550 450 1550 1550 450 1606 1603 474 1613 1613 506
Low Pivotal NCB
e2 Losses 1181 506 281 1172 516 282 1270 529 313 1246 545 309
Low Pivotal NCB
b2 Losses 1350 1350 450 1350 1350 450 1379 1395 469 1388 1385 469
Low Pivotal NCB
a2 Losses 1350 1350 450 1350 1350 450 1398 1398 474 1435 1361 474
Losses multiplied by 1000000 ***1 NCB1 st 23,27,31,34 ; NCB2 st 19,38,42,46
***2 NCB1 st 23,27,31,34,38,42 ; 2 st 19,46 ***3 NCB1 st 23,27,31,34 ; 2 st 19,38,42,46
***4 NCB1 st 27,31,34,42 ; 2 st 19,23,38,46 ***5 NCB1 st 27,31,34,42,46 ; 2 st 19,23,38
***6 NCB1 st 31,34,42 ; 2 st 19,23,24,27,32 ***7 NCB1 st 34,42,44,60 ; 2 st 19,23,24,52,56,64
***8 NCB1 st 23,42 ; 2 st 19,24,41,46 ***9 NCB1 st 27,31,34,38 ; 2 st 19,23,42,46
***10 NCB1 st 31-34 ; 2 st 23,24,41,42
***10
EBM not constrained
EBM not constrained EBM not constrained NCB1st6, NCB2st11
***7
***9
NCB1 in st 7, 10 NCB2 in st 6, 11 ***8
EBM not constrained
EBM not constrained NCB2st6, NCB1st11
EBM not constrained NCB2st6, NCB1st11 EBM not constrained
EBM not constrained
***5
EBM not constrained NCB2st6, NCB1st11 ***6
EBM not constrained
Losses of all agents for no correlation of the supply shocks - Default rate = 1%
NCB2 in st 6, 11
EBM not constrained
EBM not constrained EBM not constrained NCB2st6, NCB1st11 ***4
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EBM not constrained NCB1st6, NCB2st11 ***1
NCB1 in st 6, 11 ***2
EBM not constrained
EBM not constrained NCB1st6, NCB2st11 ***3




LoG1 LoG2 LoEB LoG1 LoG2 LoEB LoG1 LoG2 LoEB LoG1 LoG2 LoEB
Bench- Pivotal NCB
mark Losses 1350 1350 450 1352 1352 452 1402 1402 478 1399 1399 475
High Pivotal NCB
λG2 Losses 1350 2475 450 1353 2476 452 1402 2553 478 1399 2551 475
High Pivotal NCB
λG1, λG2  Losses 2475 2475 450 2478 2478 452 2553 2553 478 2550 2550 475
High Pivotal NCB
π G2 Losses 1350 1400 450 1349 1408 451 1402 1446 478 1399 1447 475
High Pivotal NCB
π G1, π G2  Losses 1400 1400 450 1405 1405 451 1446 1446 478 1447 1447 475
High Pivotal NCB
y2 Losses 1350 1550 450 1347 1564 451 1402 1590 478 1399 1597 475
High Pivotal NCB
y1. y2  Losses 1550 1550 450 1559 1559 451 1591 1590 478 1600 1599 475
Low Pivotal NCB
e2 Losses 1181 506 281 1189 500 282 1237 551 306 1262 551 320
Low Pivotal NCB
b2 Losses 1350 1350 450 1352 1352 452 1383 1399 472 1384 1392 470
Low Pivotal NCB
a2 Losses 1350 1350 450 1337 1365 451 1402 1402 478 1399 1399 475
Losses multiplied by 1000000 ***1  NCB1 in states 21,31,42 ; NCB2 in states 23,41,46
***2  NCB1 in st.21,23,31,42;NCB2 in st.41,46 ***3  NCB1 st 3,7,23,42,46; 2 st. 4,19,24,41
EBM not constrained NCB2st6, NCB1st11
EBM not constrained ***1 NCB2st6, NCB1st11 NCB1 in st 10
NCB1st10, NCB2st7 NCB2st6, NCB1st11 EBM not constrained
EBM not constrained NCB1st10, NCB2st7 NCB2st6, NCB1st11 ***1
***1
EBM not constrained NCB1 in st 7 NCB1 in st 6 ***3
EBM not constrained NCB1st10, NCB2st7 NCB2st6, NCB1st11
NCB1st10, NCB2st7
***1
EBM not constrained NCB1st10, NCB2st7 NCB2st6, NCB1st11 ***1
EBM not constrained NCB1st10, NCB2st7 NCB2st6, NCB1st11 ***1
NCB1st10, NCB2st7 NCB2st6, NCB1st11
NCB1st10, NCB2st7
Losses of all agents for no correlation of the supply shocks - Default rate = 1.5%
***1
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EBM not constrained
EBM not constrained





Gov 1 Gov 2 EBM Gov 1 Gov 2 EBM Gov 1 Gov 2 EBM
Benchmark MF MF MF MF / M MF / M MF / M MF MF MF
High λG2 MF MF MF MF / M MF / M MF / M MF MF MF
High λG1, λG2 MF MF MF MF / M MF / M MF / M MF MF MF
High π 2 MF M MF MF / M MF / M MF / M M MF MF
High π 1, π 2 M M MF MF / M MF / M MF / M MF MF MF
High y2 MF M MF MF / M MF / M MF / M M MF MF
High y1, y2 M M MF MF / M MF / M MF / M MF MF MF
Low e2 MF M MF M MF MF MF M MF
Low b2 MF MF MF MF / M MF / M MF / M MF MF MF
Low a2 M MF MF MF / M MF / M MF / M M MF MF
Most preferred publicaton alternatives
Def. = 0.5%  Default rate = 1% Def. =  1.5%
Figure 11:
Default
rate LoGO LoGN LoEB LoGO LoGN LoEB LoGO LoGN LoEB LoGO LoGN LoEB
After Pivotal  NCB
recession Losses 506 1581 281 500 1595 282 549 1645 306 551 1665 320
After Pivotal  NCB
boom Losses 506 1581 281 505 1577 282 550 1629 306 553 1665 339
***1  NCB1 in states 2,4,34,42,44 ; NCB2 in states 10,21,23,31
***2  NCB1 in states 21,31,34,44,52,56,58,60,62,64 ; NCB2 in st 18,20,22-24,28,32,42,55,61,63
EBM not constrained NCB1st16, NCB2st8 NCB2 in st 6 ***2
EBM not constrained NCB1 in st 10 NCB1 in st 11 ***1
Losses of all agents for no correlation of the supply shocks
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Enlargement of the EMU
Figure 12:
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